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A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
MICROSTRUCTURE OF MOVING
AVERAGE RULES IN A DOUBLE
AUCTION MARKET
CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
University of Technology, Sydney
PAOLO PELLIZZARI
Ca’ Foscari University
Inspired by the theoretically oriented dynamic analysis of moving average rules in the
model of Chiarella, He, and Hommes (CHH) [Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 30 (2006), 1729–1753], this paper conducts a dynamic analysis of a more realistic
microstructure model of continuous double auctions in which the probability of
heterogeneous agents trading is determined by the rules of either fundamentalists
mean-reverting to the fundamental or chartists choosing moving average rules based on
their relative performance. With such a realistic market microstructure, the model is able
not only to obtain the results of the CHH model but also to characterize most of the
stylized facts including volatility clustering, insignificant autocorrelations (ACs) of
returns, and significant slowly decaying ACs of the absolute returns. The results seem to
suggest that a comprehensive explanation of several statistical properties of returns is
possible in a framework where both behavioral traits and realistic microstructure have a
role.
Keywords: Microstructure Model, Continuous Double Auctions, Heterogeneous Agents,
Stylized Facts
1. INTRODUCTION
In traditional economic and finance theory based on the assumptions of investor
homogeneity and rational expectations, agents rationally incorporate all relevant
information into their trading decisions. Hence the movement of prices is assumed
to be perfectly random and to exhibit random walk behavior. The theory does
provide a benchmark framework for our understanding of the dynamics of financial
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asset prices, but it ignores some of the most important features of real-world
economic agents, such as their heterogeneity and bounded rationality, and the
impact of their interaction on the particular structure of financial markets. Also,
empirical investigations of high-frequency (such as daily) financial time series in
financial markets show some common stylized facts, including excess volatility,
some skewness and excess kurtosis, fat tails, and volatility clustering; see Pagan
(1996) for a comprehensive discussion of stylized facts characterizing financial
time series and Lux (2006) for a recent survey of empirical evidence on various
power laws. These facts are not entirely contradictory to traditional economic and
finance theory, but standard results do not provide persuasive explanations for a
large subset of these facts.
As a result, the literature has witnessed an increasing number of attempts at
modeling financial markets by incorporating heterogeneous agents and bounded
rationality, on which there is a nice overview in the recent surveys by Lux (2006,
2009), Hommes (2006), LeBaron (2006), and Chiarella et al. (2009a). This class
of models characterizes the dynamics of financial asset prices as resulting from the
interaction of heterogeneous agents having different attitudes to risk and different
expectations about the future evolution of prices. One of the key aspects of these
models is that they exhibit expectations feedback—agents’ decisions are based
upon predictions of future values of endogenous variables whose actual values are
determined by equilibrium equations. In particular, Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998) proposed an adaptive belief system model of financial markets. The agents
adapt their beliefs over time by choosing from different predictors or expectation
functions, based upon their past performance. The resulting nonlinear dynamical
system is, as Brock and Hommes (1998 and Hommes 2002) show, capable of gen-
erating a wide range of complex price behavior from local stability to high-order
cycles and chaos. It is very interesting to find that adaptation, evolution, hetero-
geneity, and even learning can be incorporated into the Brock and Hommes type of
framework; for details of such extensions, the reader should consult Gaunersdorfer
(2000), Chiarella and He (2001, 2002, 2003), Hommes (2001, 2002), and Chiarella
et al. (2002) for asset markets and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) and Westerhoff
(2003) for foreign exchange markets. Moreover, the recent articles by Westerhoff
(2004) and Chiarella et al. (2005, 2006a) show that complex price dynamics
may also result within a multiasset market framework. This broader framework
of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents can also give rise to quite rich and
complicated dynamics and so give a deeper understanding of market behavior.
In particular, it is capable of explaining various types of market behavior, such
as the deviation of the market price from the fundamental price, market booms
and crashes, and quite a number of the stylized facts referred to earlier. More
recently, He and Li (2007, 2008) used a simple market fraction model of funda-
mentalists and trend followers to analyze the mechanism generating the power-law
distributed fluctuations. Their results provide a promising perspective on the use
of these models to produce the observed characteristics of financial market time
series.
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In contrast to the theoretically oriented models discussed above, there is also a
rapidly expanding literature on heterogeneous-agent models that is computation-
ally oriented and for which we refer the reader to the recent survey by LeBaron
(2006). These models are becoming increasingly important and have proved very
powerful at generating the stylized facts. There are at least two important advan-
tages of this approach compared to the theoretically oriented one. The first is that
many behavioral aspects at the micro level, including the interaction of agents,
can be aggregated at the macro level through computer simulations. The second
is that more realistic market features, including budget or wealth constraints, no
short selling, and irregular intraday trading of nonfractional shares, can be readily
incorporated into the market microstructure of continuous double auctions and
dealer and hybrid markets. It should be stated that earlier work on the computa-
tional class of models faced the problem of many degrees of freedom and many
parameters, which made it difficult to understand and assess the main causes of
the observed stylized facts. Here we shall follow the path of adding some realistic
features to a model that is well understood from a theoretical perspective but
involves a minimal, in some sense, set of parameters.
The advantages of both theoretically and computationally oriented
heterogeneous-agent models have naturally led to some recent computationally
oriented models that are based on theoretically oriented models but with more
realistic market microstructure; for example, Chiarella and Iori (2002), Pellizzari
and Westerhoff (2009), and Chiarella, Iori, and Perello` (2009b). The current paper
falls into this category and conducts a dynamic analysis of a microstructure model
of continuous double auctions based on the theoretically oriented work of Chiarella
et al. (2006b) (CHH model hereafter) that gave a dynamic analysis of moving aver-
age rules under the market-maker scenario. The CHH model proposes a stochastic
dynamic financial-market model in which demand for traded assets has both a
fundamentalist and a chartist component. The chartist demand is governed by the
difference between the current price and a long-run moving average. It shows
that the moving average can be a source of market instability, and the interaction
of the moving average and market noises can lead to a tendency for the market
price to take long excursions away from the fundamental. The model, with the
addition of noise, as outlined in in Chiarella et al. (2006c), reveals various types
of market price phenomena, the coexistence of apparent market efficiency and
a large chartist component, price resistance levels, and skewness and kurtosis of
returns. In order to be able to conduct a theoretical analysis, CHH make some less
realistic assumptions, including a fixed length for the moving average window,
unlimited short selling and borrowing, trading of fractional amounts of shares,
and no intraday trading. In particular, they assume homogeneity within the two
groups of the model, fundamentalists and chartists. The current paper drops these
unrealistic assumptions and also allows the market price to be determined by a
market microstructure model of continuous double auctions (CDA) instead of by
the stylized market-maker scenario used in the CHH model. In the CHH model,
it is the probability of heterogeneous agents trading, rather than their demands,
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that is determined by the rules of either fundamentalists mean-reverting to the
fundamental or chartists choosing moving average rules based on their relative
performance. We find that, with the inclusion of this realistic market microstruc-
ture, the model is able not only to obtain the essential features of the CHH model
but also to characterize most of the stylized facts, including volatility clustering,
insignificant autocorrelations (ACs) of returns, and significant slowly decaying
ACs of the absolute returns. The results seem to suggest that a comprehensive
explanation of several statistical properties of returns is possible in a framework
where both behavioral traits and realistic microstructure have a role.
Chiarella et al. (2009b) is a computational model of an order-driven market
that has some similarities to our model. Their work, however, is more focused
on the description of the properties of the book and of the order flow, and they
assume that every agent uses a strategy that blends three components (fundamen-
talist, chartist, noisy). Instead, our traders are either fully fundamentalist or fully
chartist at any given time and have the chance to switch to another strategy when
desired. A novel feature is that agents switch individually depending on their
personal success. This is more general than what was presented in Chiarella et al.
(2006b) and in many other models where groups as a whole can switch with some
probability.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
contains the main results and a sensitivity analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2. A CONTINUOUS DOUBLE AUCTION
WITH HETEROGENEOUS TRADERS
Our model is inspired by that of Chiarella et al. (2006b), much of the structure of
which is retained in term of types of agents and behavioral characteristics behind
their demand functions. However, we extend the CHH model considerably in
order to introduce a more realistic market microstructure through a CDA, which
has become a widely used clearing device in many stock exchanges around the
world.
It is convenient to briefly outline the salient features of the CHH model. Two
types of agents, fundamentalists and chartists, populate the market, and trade
depending on the value of the fundamental price and on the trading signal gen-
erated by a fixed-length moving average of past prices. The fractions of agents
of types h ∈ {f, c}, standing for fundamentalist and chartist, respectively, evolve
according to smoothed realized profits, as pioneered in Brock and Hommes (1998).
The price reacts to the imbalance in demand and supply via a market maker, who
clears the market and announces the price for the next period. The CHH model
shows that trading based on moving averages can be destabilizing, especially if
the window length is increased. The addition of noise, either in the fundamental
process or market noise, has the potential to cause the model to generate bubbles,
crashes, and environments where the chartist component is persistent. The price
time series of the model with fundamental noise alone, however, does not exhibit
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a number of the standard statistical features found in most financial-market time
series, in particular the insignificant ACs of returns and significant slowly decay-
ing ACs of the absolute returns. Chiarella et al. (2006c) further show that with
careful selection of the sizes of the fundamental and market noise, the addition
of additive (rather than multiplicative) noise to the price equation of the market
maker brings these statistical features closer to what is observed in actual financial
data.
We stress the fact that the CHH model abstracts from many details relating to the
actual trading mechanism. Agents, for example, without considering endowments,
can in principle buy or sell unlimited quantities, acting as price takers. Demands
are filled by a market maker or an impersonal clearing device and all the chartists
use the same moving average signal for trading purposes. Although it retains
the main ideas of CHH, the main aim of this paper is to examine whether the
introduction of more realistic microstructure features into the CHH model can
maintain the main results of the CHH model and produce more realistic statistical
features of the returns generated by simulation, as recently advocated by Lux
(2009). There are two main differences of our model from the CHH model. First,
we consider a CDA where agents who can neither borrow nor short-sell submit
limit orders with no certainty that they will be filled. Exchange takes place only if
two parties agree on quantity and price, and there is a layer of intraday activity that
is missing from the original model. A book-based microstructure framework also
requires that agents be endowed with (simple) ways to deal with the fundamental
tradeoff in a continuous market: the more aggressive the limit order, the bigger
is the probability of trading but, conversely, the smaller is the final profit if the
transaction is executed. Second, our agent-based market allows the chartists to use
individual lengths for their moving average. This was indeed one of the ideas left
for future research in the original work. Based on the results obtained in this paper,
we claim that a realistic microstructure model can perturb the original model in
the “right” way, meaning that a book-based augmented CHH model is able to
produce a host of common stylized facts.
2.1. The Heterogeneous Agents and Trading
We assume that agent i in a population of N agents is initially endowed with some
units Si0 of a non–dividend paying risky stock and cash Ci0, with i = 1, . . . , N .
The endowments Sit and Cit at time t are updated in the obvious way whenever the
agents trade. Agents cannot short-sell stocks nor borrow money. In other words,
agents are banned from submitting bids with a limit price greater than their cash
endowment and, symmetrically, cannot submit an ask if they have no stocks in
their endowment. As they are restricted before submitting an order, bankruptcy
is not possible. We assume that the interest rate r = 0 or, equivalently, that the
interest rate payments are spent elsewhere.
As in the CHH model, agents are heterogeneous in that they can trade based on
a fundamentalist or chartist strategy. In the first case, they seek to buy (sell) stock
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when it is under(over)-valued with respect to an exogenously given, stochastically
fluctuating fundamental price that evolves according to
p∗t+1 = p∗t exp(σf vt ),
where σf ≥ 0 is the constant volatility of the fundamental return and vt ∼ N(0, 1)
follows a standard normal distribution. The chartists use a moving average price
(computed over time windows of heterogeneous length) to obtain buy/sell signals.
In the following, the subscript t = 1, . . . , T will refer to calendar trading days
when variables are constant over the t th “trading day,” whereas τ ∈ R+ is an
intraday time subscript that will be used with variables that can assume different
values in the same day, such as the price of stock traded in any continuous auction.
Hence, pτ is the last cleared price and it is not updated until a new transaction
takes place.
The agents can submit one limit order per day valid for one unit of the stock.1 A
limit order is a quantity–limit price couple (q, l) that is submitted in a randomly
selected instant t < τ < t + 1 of a given day t . At the beginning of each day a
random permutation Pt of {1, . . . , N} is drawn and agents take action in the order
dictated by Pt . In other words, orders are issued sequentially, in a random order
that is independently sampled every day, so that agents have only one chance to
trade each day, when it is their turn to “speak.”
Each fundamentalist trader posts an order with some probability2 t sτ =
min(1, α|p∗t − pτ |), with α > 0 denoting the sensitivity to the deviations of
the most recent price from the fundamental value, and refrains from posting with
the residual probability. The chance of submitting orders increases when this
deviation is large, and agents submit for sure whenever the mispricing is greater
than 1/α, in either direction. Formally, the order (tqiτ , t liτ ) of agent i, posted with
probability t sτ , is such that
t qiτ = sgn(p∗t − pτ ),
where sgn denotes the sign function, so that that positive (negative) arguments
lead to buy (sell) orders. We assume that the submitted limit price is uniformly
drawn between the fundamental and the last available closing price pcloset−1 ; thus
t liτ =
{
U
(
pcloset−1 , p
∗
t
)
if pcloset−1 < p∗t ;
U
(
p∗t , p
close
t−1
)
if p∗t < pcloset−1 .
The specification of the limit price is consistent with the idea that a fundamental
agent would trade at any price below (above) the fundamental value, if he/she were
a buyer (seller) within the trading day. Hence, he/she provides (limited) liquidity
at price levels that are, at the same time, more favorable than the previous closing
price and secure some random profit with respect to the fundamental value, if
executed. We can also interpret this bidding strategy, which has similarities to that
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of the zero intelligence constrained (ZIC) traders in Gode and Sunder (1993), as
the choice of a random mark-up (mark-down) with respect to the reservation price
of the fundamentalists that is given by the fundamental value p∗t .
Each chartist submits an order with probability t rτ = |tanh(a tψLiτ )|, where
a > 0 measures the strength of the extrapolation activity of the chartists and
tψ
Li
τ = pτ − maLit defines a trading signal, namely the difference between the
current price and a moving average of length Li of the particular chartist, maLit =
1/Li
∑Li
j=1 p
close
t−j . The limit order, submitted by the chartists with probability t rτ ,
is (tqiτ , t liτ ), where
t qiτ = sgn
(
tψ
Li
τ
)
,
t liτ = pτ (1 +  tzτ ),
t zτ ∼ N(0, 1), and the standard deviation  > 0 is related to the aggressiveness
of the agents in increasing the bid or in reducing the ask with respect to the current
intraday price pτ . A large  would produce bids exceeding the price by a large
amount, and the same holds for aggressively low asks. Smaller values for ,
conversely, would produce a lot of limit prices that are very close to the last price.
Even if the proportion of improving bids or asks is constantly 50%, the latter case is
likely to produce smooth price movements, whereas the former has the potential to
induce large jumps in prices due to adjacent trades at rapidly increasing/decreasing
levels.3 This formulation captures the fact that the fundamental agents behave
differently from the chartists. The former are anchoring their limit price to the
difference of the intraday price from the last closing fundamental price available,
whereas the latter are more sensitive to intraday dynamics and focus on the
intraday price difference from the daily price moving averages with mixed short
and long time scales, depending on their random draws on the moving average
window lengths, fostering at times spectacular increases of the traded volume
within the day. This behavior appears to describe rather convincingly some aspects
of both fundamental and chartist trading, the latter being more hazardous and
speculative.
From time to time, all the agents may end up on the same side of the market
and there will be no counterparty for any outstanding order. In real markets, the
absence of bids, say, would stimulate more aggressive offers that would in turn
lead some agents to issue advantageous bids. In our model, however, agents do not
look at the state of the book or at the order imbalance (as they focus on pτ ) and
in order to ensure the correct functioning of the CDA in every situation, a small
amount of random trading is introduced to facilitate trading near the latest market
price. More precisely, with probability p , agents will issue a random order (in
place of what was described above) for a quantity ±1 with equal probability and
limit price given by pτ + σ t zτ , where t zτ ∼ N(0, 1) is newly sampled whenever
needed. The limit price is obtained by offsetting the last observed price pτ by a
random amount, whose constant standard deviation is σ .
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2.2. The Switching of Trading Strategies
The traders can switch strategy at the end of each day, when the closing price
becomes available and they can evaluate their realized profit, if any. Let It ⊆
{1, . . . , N} be the set of agents who traded on day t at some price pτi and let
Xit ∈ {f, c}, i ∈ It be their state. They compute their realized profit according to
πit =
{
pcloset − pτi i ∈ It is a buyer,
pτi − pcloset i ∈ It is a seller.
Then agents adjust an individual smoothed profit measure in their state as
UXit (i, t) = πit + ηUXit (i, t − 1), i ∈ It ,
where η(∈ [0, 1]) is a memory parameter. Observe that only agents who traded
adapt the performance of the current state Xit , whereas the other agents j ∈ It do
not alter their profit measure UXjt (j, t) = UXjt (j, t − 1).
Finally, all fundamentalists switch to chartism with probability
nc,i,t = exp[βUc(i, t)]
exp[βUf (i, t)] + exp[βUc(i, t)] , i = 1, . . . , N.
Equivalently, the probability of any chartist switching to the fundamentalist strat-
egy is given by nf,i,t = 1−nc,i,t , i = 1, . . . , N . Here β > 0 is a parameter related
to the intensity of switching: small values of β make the agents insensitive to
profits and prone to use the two strategies with equal probability. In contrast, large
values of β make them more likely to switch at once to the most profitable strategy
at time t + 1. Our switching mechanism differs in two important ways from the
standard proposal pioneered in Brock and Hommes (1998). A first difference lies
in the use of individual switching probabilities, rather than the global one that is
used in CHH. In other words, agents of the same type can have rather different
realized profit measures, due to different transaction prices (even on the same day)
and different Li’s. As a consequence, their switching can be driven by different
probabilities. In the second place, the smoothed realized profit measure is updated
by an agent only if he/she succeeds in trading. In the standard treatment, trading
always occurs, but in our setup, this does not necessarily happen, and we feel that
there is no reason to update the accumulated profits if an agents fails to trade on a
specific day. This means that, in such a case, we have UXit (i, t +1) = UXit (i, t). A
similar individual-based switching mechanism is used in Pellizzari and Westerhoff
(2009).
2.3. Timing
A typical trading day t develops as follows and is illustrated in Figure 1:
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τ1 τ2 ... τi ... τN
pcloset−1 ,ma
Li
t
p∗t and states
are known
t t +1
Intraday trading
pcloset ,πit ,UXit
are computed
and switching
takes place
FIGURE 1. Schematic representation of the unfolding of a trading day in the model.
(1) At t−, the end of day (t −1), the closing price pcloset−1 of the previous session or trading
day t − 1 and all the moving averages maLit , i = 1, . . . , N , are available.
(2) At time t+, the beginning of day t , the agents start trading at random times t <
τi < t + 1, submitting their orders to the market (with no certainty that they will be
executed).
(3) In (t + 1)− the closing price pcloset for day t is known and traders hence can compute
profits πit and adjust their performance measure UXit (i, t). Notice that if an agent is
unable to trade, his/her UXit (i, t) remain unchanged.
(4) The complementary probabilities nf,i,t and nc,i,t are computed for all agents who
possibly switch to the other strategy to be used starting at time (t + 1)+.
(5) New moving averages and new fundamental price can be computed to be used starting
at time (t + 1)+.
2.4. The Market Protocol: CDA
We describe in this section the set of rules that govern the trading process or, in
brief, the microstructure of our model. A CDA allows agents to submit orders
at any time. We consider only limit orders, that is, quantity–price couples (q, l),
to be interpreted as the binding promise to buy (sell) q units at a price no larger
(smaller) than l. We stress that, once submitted, orders cannot be canceled or
changed. Every positive real number l is a legal limit price, and we restrict the
quantity to be q = ±1 to denote orders on the sell (−1) or buy (+1) side. All
the orders are sorted, kept in a book, and, if the book is nonempty, let am ≥
am−1 ≥ . . . a2 ≥ a1 > b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . bn be the sequence of asks and bids,
denoted by ai and bj , respectively. The biggest bid b1 is called the best bid and
the smallest ask a1 is called the best ask.4 Whenever a new limit order (q, l)
is submitted, it is matched against the opposite side to find the best compatible
price. If possible, the order is executed at the price of the matched order (either
a1 or b1). If no match is found, the order is inserted into the appropriate book.
In more detail, if q = 1 and l ≥ a1 then one unit is exchanged at the price a1
between the agents whose orders crossed and the best ask is removed from the
book; otherwise the submitted order is inserted among the bids so that the buying
queue becomes b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bj ≥ l ≥ bj+1 ≥ . . . ≥ bn. In the same way,
if q = −1 and l ≤ b1, then one unit is exchanged at the price b1 between the
agents with crossing orders and the best bid is removed from the book; otherwise
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the submitted order is inserted among the asks so that the selling queue becomes
am ≥ am−1 ≥ . . . ≥ aj ≥ l ≥ aj−1 ≥ . . . ≥ a1.
We assume that at the end of the trading day, the book is completely erased, so
that the next trading day begins with no queued orders. The Tokyo Stock Exchange,
for example, adopts this procedure, whereas other markets let some orders survive
across “days” according to different rules.
3. SIMULATION RESULTS
3.1. Parameter Selection
We discuss in this section the results obtained by simulation of the model previ-
ously described. For each parameter set we run the market 100 times for T = 2,500
trading days, constituting a period of about 10 years. The first 500 observations are
discarded to avoid transient effects due mainly to the need to initialize the moving
averages randomly.5 We are then left with 100 series of 1,999 logarithmic returns
that can be analyzed. The choice of the parameters is guided by the values that
were used in CHH but still required some trial and error in order to get realistic
time series, as in most time series analysis of heterogeneous agent-based models.
In order to provide a comparison, we have resimulated 100 time series according
to Chiarella et al. (2006c), focusing on the case of constant-amplitude noise, which
is the most interesting as far as stylized facts are concerned. It is often the case
in agent-based models that the number of parameters is large, as heterogeneity is
allowed at the level of the single agent; for example, the length Li of the moving
average and initial endowments Ci0, Si0 differ across agents. However, we resort to
the standard technique of sampling the individual parameters from a single distri-
bution, thus enormously cutting down the number of effective parameters. All the
length Li, i = 1, . . . , N , are sampled from the set of integers {20, 21, . . . , 100},
which contains commonly used values for moving average lengths. Likewise, the
distribution of the initial endowments is the same for each agent and it is chosen so
that on the average agents have a number of stock whose value is equal to the cash
they hold. Given that no short selling or borrowing is allowed, this means that there
is no systematic bias in favor of buyers and sellers. The remaining parameters are
listed in Table 1. Observe that σ is a constant fraction of the initial fundamental
price p∗0 and that α (the reaction coefficient of the fundamentalists) and β (the
intensity of switching), which are not individual parameters indexed by i, can have
different values in some of the 100 simulations, as they are uniformly drawn from
a “small” set of nearby values. This is done to test for the local robustness of our
results with respect to slight changes in α and β.
3.2. Time Series and Distribution Results
Some representative time series are shown in Figure 2. The graphs depict the
results of two typical simulations in the two columns. The first row of the picture
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TABLE 1. Parameters used in the simulation
Parameter Value Description
N 1000 Number of agents
Si0 {1, 2, . . . , 9} Initial stock endowment
Ci0 1000Si0 Initial cash endowment
pclose0 1000 Initial price
p∗0 990 Initial fundamental value
α { 171000 , 181000 , 191000 } Reaction coefficient for fundamentalists
a 0.1 Reaction coefficient for chartists
Li {20, 21, . . . , 100} Length of MA windows
 0.005 Aggressiveness parameter
β { 116 , 117 } Intensity of switching
η 0.2 Profit smoothing parameter
p 0.05 Probability to issue a random order
σf 0.005 Volatility of fundamental value (daily)
σ σf p
∗
0 Volatility of random offset by noise traders
shows the time series of the market price and the fundamental value. They share
a common feature found in the CHH model, namely that the price is tracking
the fundamental value but the deviations are persistent and sizable. The strong
bimodality of the distribution of the density of the difference pt − p∗t in the
last row confirms that the price stays for long times either below or above the
fundamental price, as can be verified by a careful study of the panels in the first
row. It is worth noting that this result was already present in Chiarella et al.
(2006c), hinting that some properties of the original and more theoretical model
are robustly retained in our model where realism is added with bilateral trading,
budget constraints, and no short selling.
The logarithmic returns rt = log(pt/pt−1) are represented for the same time
span in the second row. There are episodes of large change in price (in absolute
value) and visual evidence of some degree of volatility clustering when the price
surges or crashes. The third and fourth rows illustrate the autocorrelation of rt
and |rt |. The linear predictability of the returns is very weak, pointing to some
form of efficiency of the market. At the same time, the absolute returns are
significantly correlated and slowly decaying for up to 20–30 lags, thus confirming
heteroskedasticity in returns. However, we do not find evidence of long memory
in volatility, which sometimes extends for many lags in real time series.
Obtaining uncorrelated raw returns and long memory in the absolute returns are
indeed the most difficult things to calibrate in most agent-based models [see Lux
(2006) and He and Li (2007) for related discussion], and a subtle balance between
α, β, and  in our model is needed. Loosely speaking, there must be occasional
large returns and occurrences of “spikes,” but these must not be too frequent, in
order to avoid positive serial correlation at low lags. Price spikes can be induced
by increasing β, which triggers more switches to the current best performing
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FIGURE 2. Some representative time series. From the top, the panels show the price and
fundamental value; returns; autocorrelation of raw and absolute returns; density of returns
(with a normal distribution with same mean and variance); and density of the difference
between the price and the fundamental value.
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FIGURE 3. Evolution of the fraction of fundamentalist (black) and chartist (gray) traders for
the same time series depicted in Figure 2. For convenience, the price is shown as a dashed
line (see the right right-hand vertical axis).
strategy, and , which can cause avalanches of rapidly surging or dropping prices.
At the same time, α controls the activity of the fundamental traders, who step
in and reverse the trend. The fundamentalists are also exploiting the fact that the
finite budgets of the chartists force them to exhaust their resources after prolonged
trends, as they cannot buy when their cash is over or (short-)sell when their stock
holdings are null.
The fifth row of Figure 2 shows that the distribution of returns is leptokurtic
and fat-tailed: the kurtosis for the depicted returns’ time series is 5.34 (left) and
29.30 (right).
3.3. Market Fractions
Figure 3 plots the fractions of fundamentalists (black) and chartists (gray) and
the market prices as functions of time. The technical component of the market is
generically preponderant but, unlike the case in the CHH model, the correlation
between the fraction of the chartists, and price changes is harder to spot. We
feel that this is due to the heterogeneity of the chartists, who are no longer
clearly responsible for bubbles and crashes. Remarkably, the market fractions of
the fundamentalists are always below 50%, whereas the market fractions of the
chartists are always above 50%. This implies that the market is dominated by
the chartists most of the time. We do not observe the dramatic switching of all
the agents to either one of the trading strategies, which is the striking feature of
switching models such as the Brock and Hommes and CHH ones.
3.4. Statistical Results
The upper portion of Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics of the simulated
returns averaged across the set of all our simulations. The maximum daily return,
for example, exceeds 9.4% for half of our simulations, whereas the smallest return
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TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics of the returns of the simulations
of the model (upper panel) and of Chiarella et al. (2006c) (lower
panel)
Max Min Sd Skew Kurt Volume
Median 0.094 −0.115 0.016 −0.032 9.631 162.2
Mean 0.218 −0.247 0.021 −0.537 55.343 160.4
Median 0.050 −0.051 0.014 0.001 3.380 —
Mean 0.056 −0.056 0.014 −0.002 3.484 —
Note: We report the median and mean value (across 100 independent simulations) of the
biggest and smallest returns, volatility, skewness and kurtosis of returns.
is smaller than −11.5% in 50% of the cases. Some mild negative asymmetry is
confirmed by the negative skewness in the time series of returns.
Table 2 confirms again that there is a fair amount of excess volatility and
excess kurtosis. In all the simulations, the volatility of the fundamental process
was fixed at 0.5% daily and hence trading is responsible for the inflated standard
deviation of price returns (about 1.6%). The number of exchanged units (volume) is
typically close to 160 per day. For comparison, the same statistics for the Chiarella
et al. (2006c) data in the lower panel reveal that returns are slightly less volatile,
have much smaller extreme values, are nearly symmetric, and have little excess
kurtosis.
3.5. Behavior of Autocorrelation
In order to show effectively that many simulated time series exhibit very weak
linear predictability but strong volatility clustering, we summarize the statistical
properties of end-of-day autocorrelations by taking averages across the simula-
tions. We denote by ρˆjk and γˆjk the estimated j -lag autocorrelations of raw and
absolute returns of the kth simulation, respectively. The distribution of the sampled
values ρˆjk and γˆjk , k = 1, . . . , 100, of the autocorrelation at j lags can then be
graphically condensed for all j = 1, . . . , 100, as shown in the top part of Figure 4.
The graphs depict, for each lag j , a simplified version of the box-and-whisker plot
of ρˆjk and γˆjk; see Becker et al. (1998) for details. In particular, all the medians
indicated by thick horizontal lines, and most “boxes,” that lie between the first
and third quartile are well within a 2σ confidence band (dashed lines) for the ρˆjk .
Our data display a slight negative medium-range correlation of returns (within the
confidence bands at the 5% level) and, despite some outliers at specific lags for
some time series, the left part of the figure shows that about 50% of the simulations
satisfy the strict requirement of having all autocorrelation coefficients within the
band, thus pointing to the fact that the model is robustly generating extremely low
linear predictability in returns.
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FIGURE 4. End-of-day autocorrelation of raw (left) and absolute returns (right) for the
CDA (top) and the CHH (bottom) models. For each lag j on the horizontal axis we
depict the box-and-whisker plot of the 100 coefficients ρˆjk and γˆjk, k = 1, . . . , 100.
The median is shown by the thick line and the “boxes” depicts the interquartile range
of the data. Outlying points extending beyond the “whiskers” are visible as single points
(circles).
The top right graph of Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of the autocorrela-
tions γˆjk of absolute returns. Evidence of volatility clustering is present when
correlations exceed the upper dashed line. More than 50% of time series have
significant heteroskedasticity for more than 15 lags and one quarter of the simu-
lations strongly extend this features for 30 lags. Both the realizations depicted in
Figure 2 are in this set. The reader should realize that we are not claiming that
all our time series are equally realistic, and there are manifestly outlying “bad”
cases in terms of autocorrelation in Figure 4. Instead, this aggregate examination
is meant to validate a broad set of simulations showing that very often the results
of the model are quite satisfactory.
The bottom part of Figure 4 shows the boxplots of autocorrelations of returns
and absolute returns for 100 simulations of the Chiarella et al. (2006c) model.
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The lower left panel of Figure 4 shows that the first few raw autocorrelations are
significant and positive for a large number of series (more than 75% of times for
the first lag and more than 25% of times for lags up to six). Hence, there is often
residual predictability that is not found in empirical series. The lower right panel of
Figure 4 shows many significant autocorrelations of absolute returns (which are,
however, not uncorrelated, as just pointed out). The slow decay of autocorrelations
lasts on average for many lags.6
To wrap things up, our model can deliver asymmetric and markedly leptokurtic
returns, with virtually no linear predictability and slow decay of absolute auto-
correlations for 20–30 lags; for comparison, the original CHH model, albeit able
to display long memory in some cases, has symmetric returns with low excess
kurtosis and several significant autocorrelations at first lags.
3.6. Noise and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we discuss the sensitivity to some key parameters, focusing in
particular on the effects of the various sources of noise that operate in our setup.7
We recall that randomness has a role in several components of the model. The first
is the selection of the order (permutation) in which agents bid during a trading
session. Second, the orders of the fundamentalists are randomly selected in the
interval described by the fundamental value and the actual price. Third, chartists’
bids or asks offset the price by a random amount with standard deviation .
Finally, the fundamental process changes are governed by σf . The model appears
to be much more sensitive to the two last sources of noise and hence we limit our
discussion to  and σf . We also try to give some impression of the impact of the
fraction p of noise traders.
Decreasing  reduces the intensity of the stylized facts. Setting  = 0.0025,
that is, halving the benchmark value, still produces uncorrelated, nonnormal,
and leptokurtic returns, but only one-fourth of the simulations display significant
autocorrelations of absolute returns for up to 10 lags. The median (mean) volatility
of returns decreases to 0.01125 (0.01155) and the kurtosis drops to median (mean)
values of 4.15 (4.42). Figure 5 depicts a typical time series when  = 0.0025.
Doubling  causes large and explosive swings in prices that break down the
similarity to realistic time series.
Setting σf = 0.25%, that is, reducing the changes in the fundamental price,
results in smoother and somewhat pseudocyclic time series with pronounced
autocorrelation and very mild traces of heteroskedasticity. The median (mean)
volatility and kurtosis across 100 simulations with σf = 0.25% are 0.008955
(0.009061) and 3.87 (5.48). A typical time series in Figure 6 depicts only slightly
nonnormal features. Similar to what happens for large , increasing the size of
σf to 1% daily produces excessive volatility and kurtosis, in the range 4–5% and
50–100, respectively.
To conclude this analysis, we investigate the importance of the proportion p
of noise traders in the model. As we argued before, they are needed to “move”
the price when all other agents are on the same side of the market. One could ask
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FIGURE 5. Price and fundamental value time series for one representative simulation ob-
tained when  = 0.0025. The density of returns (with a normal distribution superimposed)
and a QQ-plot are also shown. The volatility and kurtosis of the depicted returns are 1.27%
and 4.17, respectively.
about the extent of the statistical properties that can be generated by noise traders
alone. Indeed, Maslov (2000) and LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2003) argue that the
CDA can generate some stylized facts even with very simple behavior on the part
of the agents. We run 100 simulations where only the fraction p of noise traders
submit orders (while the fundamentalists and chartists are inactive) to evaluate the
incremental effect of the intertwined action of chartists and fundamentalists. The
time series produced in these purely noisy markets are random walk–like and there
is no connection between the fundamental value and the price of the stock. This is
obvious, as no trader is using p∗t to submit orders and, not surprisingly, the returns
are white and there is no autocorrelation of absolute returns at any lag. The median
(mean) volatility and kurtosis across all the simulations are 0.01214 (0.01211) and
4.480 (4.508). Hence, purely noisy markets exhibit insignificant correlations and
some degree of leptokurtosis in returns, confirming the findings of the previously
cited works, but there is no volatility clustering and smaller standard deviation.
Moreover, no herding due to switching is detected, as active agents just bid or ask
in an entirely random manner and the performance measure is erratic. All of this
evidence indicates that the noise traders alone are not responsible for volatility
clustering and the slowly decaying ACs of the absolute returns observed when
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FIGURE 6. Price and fundamental value time series for one representative simulation ob-
tained when σf = 0.25%. The density of returns (with a normal distribution superimposed
in red) and a QQ-plot are also shown. The volatility and kurtosis of the depicted returns
for this realization are 0.88% and 3.73, respectively.
both the fundamentalists and chartists are active in the market. To summarize, our
results are definitely richer than the ones that can be obtained with purely random
traders, even if some stylized facts can still be obtained in a weak form in this case.
4. CONCLUSION
Inspired by the theoretically oriented CHH model under the market-maker clearing
mechanism, this paper conducts a dynamic analysis of a microstructure model of
continuous double auctions. The model removes some less realistic assumptions
in the CHH model, including the fixed length of the moving average window,
unlimited short selling and borrowing, trading of fractional shares, and no intraday
trading, and in particular, the homogeneity among each type of fundamentalist and
chartist. With a realistic market microstructure, the model is able not only to obtain
the results of the CHH model but also to characterize many of the stylized facts,
including slow decay of correlation of absolute returns. Our results seem to suggest
that a comprehensive explanation of several statistical properties of the returns is
possible in a framework where both behavioral traits and realistic microstructure
have a role.
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In this paper, we have not paid attention to the dynamics of the intraday price.
Also, it is not clear whether and to what extent other clearing mechanisms than the
CDA, such as automated dealerships or hybrid markets, would affect our results.
We leave these issues for future research.
NOTES
1. Technically, they may submit no order in some circumstances, as they cannot sell short nor
borrow. Allowing for cancellations of orders, resubmissions, multiple orders, or other features within
a trading day would hugely complicate the model and would require much richer modeling of the
agents’ behavior. Moreover, we do not think that single-unit orders constitute a severe limitation for an
agent willing to buy/sell multiple units, as he/she can keep trading for several days to reach the desired
quantities. Chiarella, Iori, and Perello` (2009) provide a modeling framework of CDA markets where
agents do form multiple unit-demand functions based on utility maximization.
2. Note that the form of the probability will be the same for each fundamentalist, but it will yield
a different value for each of them, as the pτ could possibly change at each instant, determined by the
sequencing of the agents.
3. This mechanism is the reason that we do not model a ticked book; that is, we do not force limit
prices to be on a discrete grid of finite step size δ. Sequences of improving orders can drive the price
considerably up or down even if the δ is relatively small, whereas picking δ → 0 can basically lead
to too little variation in prices and excessively peaked returns’ distribution. Allowing a continuous
limit price offers considerable flexibility, as it turns out that  can be tuned more easily than the
“corresponding” discrete tick δ.
4. Slightly different orderings are possible with orders having the same limit price, based on the
quantity or the time of submission. In this paper, as all orders have unit quantity, we resort to strict
time preference to break ties.
5. Given that the length Li of the moving average is at most L = 100 and we discard 500
observations, the initial randomization should have little or no effect.
6. One way to formally assess the presence of long memory is based on the computation of the
Hurst exponent H for the returns. In the benchmark case of independent increments, the exponent
takes the value H = 1/2, with values higher than 1/2 pointing to some form of persistence. Estimated
values are never higher than 0.4 for our simulated time series, whereas they exceed 1/2 in 25 cases
out of 100 for the Chiarella et al. (2006c) simulations. In close agreement with the visual evidence
provided by Figure 4, long memory can be ruled out for our model, whereas it is present in one-fourth
of the cases for the CHH model with added noise.
7. We have discussed previously the outcomes for other parameters, such as α and β. The initial
amount of risky units and cash is also relevant. We feel that this is rather intuitive: for example,
increasing the cash relative to the stock can fuel longer and more pronounced rises of prices, as agents
can mechanically buy more stocks. In more realistic models, risk-related considerations are possibly
limiting the positions, but our simple agents are “dumb” in this respect and prone to take extreme
positions if they can.
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